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Molecular biology has
been a great leveller
and has made
thinking unnecessary
in many areas of
modern biology. With
the disappearance of
theory has also come
the decline of
experimentation, and
the practice of
science by hypothesis
and testing is not known by many
students in the field. So powerful are
contemporary tools for extracting
answers from nature that pausing to
think about the results, or asking
how one might find out how cells
really work, is likely to be seen as a
source of irritating delay to the
managerial classes, and could even
endanger the career of the
questioner.
There was a time when we
lacked this direct contact with the
molecular level of living organisms
and had to probe it by indirect
means. We had no other alternative
but to have ideas on what might be
there and then design experiments
to test the ideas. This was the period
when the term model was very much
in vogue; there were models of gene
regulation, protein synthesis,
recombination, chromosome
replication and many others. The
main arguments between authors
and referees were whether the
experimental results offered
supported the model uniquely, or
whether alternative explanations
were possible. Scientific meetings
were more interesting because real
argument was possible and
suggestions for new experiments
could be discussed.
The truth of a theory had two
aspects: the first was whether it was
correct, that is it contained no logical
inconsistencies; the second, and
more important, was whether it
corresponded to the situation in the
real world. I recall a meeting in the
1970s where a speaker presented two
different models of transposition,
which we can call A and B. The
climax of the talk came when the
speaker triumphantly declared that
there were only two possibilities:
“Either A is right and B is wrong, or
B is right and A is wrong.” He had to
be reminded that he had overlooked
a third possibility which was that
they were both wrong.
These and other experiences led
me to suspect models or theories that
had been built when only some of
the facts where known. So for dealing
with models of how neurons might
interact to produce behaviour, I
invented a sceptic who would always
ask: “How do you know there is not
another wire that comes up the back
of the animal and does something
you have not accounted for?” Unlike
in physics, where we might be able to
deal with the ‘another wire’ sceptic
on general principles, the only way to
do so in biology is to be able to say
that we know all the wires and
therefore that there are no other
wires. I use ‘wire’ in a general sense:
good theories of molecular or cellular
networks will need knowledge of all
the connections.
Many of our discussions resorted
to the use of Occam’s razor. This
allowed one to formulate the
simplest hypothesis by cutting away
extraneous hypotheses. Of course,
quite often neither the simplest
theory, nor the most elegant (another
popular word of the time), turned out
to be right. We knew so few facts
that quite frequently a hypothesis
had to be stretched out to encompass
them all. I found that many people
were applying, what I called Occam’s
Broom, which was used to sweep
under the carpet any unpalatable
facts that did not support the
hypothesis.
For a time, I thought that having
a model with one’s name attached
might be the path to immortality in
science. It seemed even better than
having a conjecture in mathematics
because the ‘Brenner Conjecture’,
which sounds wonderful, could
always be disproved and replaced by
the ‘Dampener Theorem’.
(Mathematicians tell me that lemmas
are very chic and much safer than
conjectures.) 
In experimental science, it might
appear that a piece of equipment is
the thing to have: there is the
Pasteur pipette, the Büchner funnel,
the Petri dish, the Erlenmeyer flask,
and so on. However, these are all
becoming obsolete and the robots
that are replacing them are called
after the companies that make them.
My plan of acquiring fame second-
hand by taking an additional
surname to become Bunsen-Brenner
would have come to nought, except
possibly in the third world.
I need to confess that I have
always wanted to be a theoretician
but until computers were invented I
could not deal with mathematics. I
spent hours of my youth trying to
understand embryology or, as we call
it today, developmental biology. I
read Needham, Waddington and
even Woodger. At one time I even
understood the different meanings of
induction and evocation. 
This nonsense prepared me for
attending a select and secret
conclave of biologists who met in
Woods Hole in the 1960s to discuss
such matters as whether
differentiation was a ‘state’ or a
process, and what was the difference
between these anyway. I was able to
say it was both and to illuminate the
difference by pointing out that
‘mellowing out’ was a process
whereby one attained the ‘laid back’
state.
Actually, the orgy of fact
extraction in which everybody is
currently engaged has, like most
consumer economies, accumulated a
vast debt. This is a debt of theory
and some of us are soon going to
have an exciting time paying it back
— with interest, I hope.
R202 Current Biology, Vol 7 No 3
